




After a record growth of 31/2 per cent in 2000 (see
Figure 1.1), the highest level in the past ten years,
economic expansion in the European economy1
slowed significantly in 2001, and towards the end of
the year growth came to a near standstill.This slow-
down had started already in the second half of 2000
and it was affected, firstly, by the
rapid price increase for oil and
other energy sources. Secondly,
the central banks in Western
Europe had tightened monetary
policy to stem the danger of
inflation. Last but not least, the
world economy weakened sig-
nificantly as the boom in the
United States came to a sudden
end.The terrorist attacks on 11th
September caused an additional
shock to business and consumer
confidence not only in the Uni-
ted States but also in the global
economy including Europe. This
event is expected to prolong the
slowdown of the European
economy.
It is difficult to disentangle the
impact of these different
adverse factors on aggregate
demand in Europe. But the
beginning of the downturn in
the second half of 2000 was
associated with the drastic
worsening in the terms of trade
from the cumulative effects of
the oil price explosion and the
weak euro (see Figure 1.2). The higher prices for
energy were followed by a price increase for food-
stuffs – much of the latter due to animal epidemics
– and led to a sharp rise in consumer prices absorb-
ing purchasing power for other goods (see Figu-
re 1.3). In 2000 the terms of trade of the Euro area
deteriorated by 1.3 per cent of GDP. More recent-
ly prices of foodstuff and energy have declined
again with oil prices falling back close to their level
in 1999.The deterioration of the labour market and
additional economic and political uncertainties
emerging in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks
of 11th September, have added to the dampening
of consumer spending.




1 Real GDP increased by 3.5 per cent in
the Euro area and by 3.3 per cent in the
European Union.CESifo Forum Special 7
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Exports of the Euro area rose strongly up to the end
of 2000, boosted by the high order backlog and
improvements in competitiveness as a result of the
weak euro. In early 2001, however, a decline in for-
eign demand became evident and exports stagnated
during the course of the year. Investment activity
also weakened,and in some countries the continued
fall of building investment was a further drag on
aggregate demand. With the sharp cyclical slow-
down of production, seasonally adjusted unemploy-
ment stopped declining and began to rise.
2. Economic Outlook
2.1 The Global Economy
In the current situation any projections for the
European economy are highly uncertain. Given the
closely synchronised sharp economic downturn in
virtually all industrial countries
and the low business and con-
sumer confidence, there is a con-
siderable risk of the global econ-
omy and the European economy
falling into a recession. In fact,
the United States and also
Germany have already entered a
recession with GDP declining in
the third quarter and with a fur-
ther decline expected for the
fourth quarter. On the other
hand, economic policies are now
on a clearly expansionary course
which should support aggregate
demand. Furthermore, the oil
price has declined to a low level
and the associated increase in
the terms of trade will stimulate
domestic demand. Finally, busi-
ness and consumer confidence
are expected to recover again –
and some leading indicators have
started to improve as well as con-
fidence in financial markets.
For the world economy the tim-
ing and strength of the US eco-
nomic recovery are of crucial
importance. The Federal Re-
serve had already lowered key
interest rates significantly be-
fore the terrorist attacks and
has reduced them further since
this shock.Since January 2001 the Fed Funds target
rate has been reduced by 43/4 percentage points
from 6.5% to 1.75% of which 11/4 percentage
points were cut after the 11th September. In addi-
tion, a large fiscal stimulus has been decided on or
is in preparation. Apart from the tax cuts which
were enacted in spring 2001, new measures were
taken (or are in preparation) after 11th September,
in particular the programme for emergency and
military spending ($40 billion),the granting of sub-
sidies to airlines ($15 billion) and another tax-cut
package which could add up to $ 90 billion over the
next two years. For 2002 the additional fiscal stim-
ulus could amount to about 1 per cent of GDP.
These expansionary policies should help the US
economy to recover gradually. However, as a good
part of the US slowdown is associated with the cor-
rection of the excessive expansion of the high-tech
sector, continued weakness of this sector could be
a drag on economic growth. We nevertheless
Fig. 1.3
Fig. 1.4assume that expansionary policies will be strong
enough to bring the downturn to a halt and achieve
a moderate recovery. The cyclical improvement in
the United States will in particular stimulate the
economies in Southeast Asia. For the Japanese
economy, however, the impetus may not be strong
enough to lead to a robust and sustainable recov-
ery. For all industrial countries, the economic
expansion will amount to only about 1 per cent in
2001 and 2002, after growth of 3.3 per cent in 2000.
2.2 The European Economy
In the summer of 2001 the European economy
appeared to be on the verge of recovery. The direct
and indirect adverse effects of the terrorist attacks in
the United States reinforced the downturn, however.
Most of the leading indicators do not suggest any
improvement in the near future (see the results of the
Ifo Economic Survey International for Western
Europe in Figure 1.4 and the results of this survey for
individual countries in Annex 1) but the low point is
likely to be reached at the turn of 2001/2002. It
appears, however, that in some countries (in particu-
lar in Germany) the downturn is more pronounced
than in other countries (e.g. France) (for further
details see the section on individual countries in
Annex 2). Nevertheless, the expected turnaround of
the US economy and the expansionary stance of
monetary conditions in Europe should contribute to
a recovery of the European economy in the course of
2002. The lower oil price and the significantly lower
prices of industrial and agricultural raw materials
provide a further stimulus to real domestic demand.
But there are still downside risks:the deterioration in
the labour market may dampen private consumption
further and, given the declining capacity utilisation,
the propensity to invest may
remain weak despite low interest
rates. Most of all, the US recov-
ery may come later or be too
weak to lead the European econ-
omy out of the current slump.
Overall, we expect only a rela-
tively moderate recovery of the
European economy during 2002;
the growth rate year-over-year is
likely to be somewhat lower than
in 2001 (see also the statistical
background tables in Annex 3).
Monetary conditions
Since last May the European
Central Bank has lowered key
interest rates in four steps by
altogether 11/2 percentage points
to 3.25% of which 1 percentage
point was done (in two equal
steps) after 11th September (see
Figure 1.5).The easing of mone-
tary policy was a response to the
cyclical weakening of the econo-
my and was facilitated by the
decline in headline inflation.
Interest rates were reduced
despite money supply growth
being continuously above its tar-
get rate.But this was not seen as
posing a risk for inflation as it
was mainly caused by portfolio
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shifts in favour of less risky liquid assets which are
part of the M3 money supply.The actual short-term
interest rate is now lower than the “optimal” rate as
measured by the Taylor rate (see Figure 1.6 and
Box). Taking into account the low real exchange
rate of the euro as well,overall monetary conditions
remain quite expansionary (see Figure 1.7).
Moreover,a further moderate cut in interest rates is
likely if the risk of recession increases. But this has
not been assumed in this forecast.
Fiscal policy
Owing to tax cuts in many European countries, fis-
cal policy had an expansionary effect in 2001.The
fiscal deficit of the Euro area
increased from 0.8 per cent of
GDP in 2000 to around 11/2 per
cent of GDP2 and a similar
deficit is expected for 2002 (see
Figure 1.8). This fiscal projec-
tion is based on the assumption
that governments allow, to a
good extent, the so-called auto-
matic stabilisers of the fiscal
system to become effective. As
the stability programmes set
targets for actual deficits on the
basis of a higher growth fore-
cast, governments are assumed
to tolerate some slippage from
these targets. If, in contrast to
our assumption, governments
stick more firmly to the fiscal
goals outlined in the stability
programmes, they would have
to take additional measures to
cut spending or increase taxes
which would dampen domestic
demand further. The current
situation highlights the risk of
setting fiscal targets without
considering possible changes in
economic conditions. It would
therefore be preferable if
future stability programmes
were to target cyclically adjust-
ed (i.e. structural) deficits
rather than actual deficits,
notwithstanding the problems
of estimating the cyclical effects
on the budget.
Taylor rule
In 1993, John Taylor from the University of Stanford established a
relationship between the optimal central bank interest rate and two
indicators: the deviation of inflation from its target and the output
gap. The Taylor rule interest rate is a kind of benchmark interest ra-
te. The rule is based on the idea that the central bank interest rate is
managed in order to ensure price stability and keep output at normal
capacity utilisation (trend GDP). Any deviation of the inflation rate
from its target and concerns about the level of output
1 will induce
the Central Bank to adjust the interest rate. If the short-term interest
rate is above the Taylor interest rate, it indicates that monetary poli-
cy is more restrictive than one would expect based on the prevailing
inflation rate and output gap. If the actual interest rate is below the
Taylor rate, it indicates that monetary policy is more expansionary
than the inflation rate and the output gap would suggest.
The formula for the Taylor rate is as follows:
I
t = i
eq + 0.5 x (y-y*) + 0.5 x (π -π *), where I
t: Taylor interest rate, i
eq:
nominal equilibrium interest rate
2, (y -y*): output gap, (π -π *): infla-
tion targeting deviation.
The more real output exceeds potential (or trend) output, the hig-
her the Taylor interest rate will be. In the same way, the more infla-
tion exceeds its target (1.75 per cent), the higher the Taylor interest
rate will be. On the assumption that the Central Bank is equally
concerned with price stability and real output, we use an equal
weighting of 0.5 for each. While there is considerable uncertainty
regarding the appropriate weighting scheme, the weights applied
here bring the Taylor rate relatively close to the actual interest rate
in most of the past years (see Fig. 1.6). Furthermore, the real equili-
brium interest rate has to be determined. According to estimates by
the Bundesbank, the real equilibrium interest rate in Germany was
roughly 3% (2.9%) during the period 1979 to 1998. We assume that
this rate also reflects the current real equilibrium interest rate in the
Euro area as a whole. So we get:
I
t = (2.9 + π  + 0.5) x output gap + 0.5 x (π –1,75)
We calculate two options for the Taylor rate, one based on the head-
line inflation rate and the other based on the core inflation rate. The
headline inflation is measured by the overall consumer price index
(in Europe, the Harmonised Consumer Price Index). By contrast,
core inflation excludes the volatile energy and food prices. The Tay-
lor rate based on the core inflation rate assumes that with a given
output gap the Central Bank raises interest rates only if core infla-
tion increases i.e. it does not react to temporary effects of energy
prices on the inflation rate.
1 The output gap is here defined as the percentage deviation of real
GDP from its trend.
2 Real equilibrium interest rate plus expected inflation rate. The ex-
pected inflation rate is set equal to the actual inflation rate in what
flows.
2 Excluding one-off revenues from the
sale of UMTS licenses in 2000. As these
receipts amounted to 1 per cent of GDP,
a surplus of 0.2 per cent of GDP was
achieved by including these receipts.Wage agreements
In the forecast it is assumed that wage developments
in Europe will remain moderate.
Given the fact that in 2001 a
good part of the increase in net
wages was absorbed by the high-
er inflation rate,there could actu-
ally be more wage pressure than
assumed here. Trade unions in
some countries have in fact
announced higher wage de-
mands. But as unemployment is
increasing and as at the time of
major wage negotiations in
spring 2002 the inflation rate will
be relatively low, it is likely that
wage increases will remain mod-
erate in Europe.
Development of demand 
components
Along with the recovery of the
world economy, the current
slump in exports should gradu-
ally come to an end. Despite
some acceleration in the
course of the year, exports will
expand by only 0.2 per cent in
2002, however, after 31/2 per
cent in 2001 and 12.1 per cent
in 2000. Private consumption
will increase on average by
1.5 per cent in 2002, which is
somewhat less than in 2001. In
2001 tax cuts in some countries
supported nominal disposable
income but at the same time
the surge in consumer prices
and the weakening of the
labour market dampened real
consumer spending. As the
labour market will remain
weak in 2002, consumer spend-
ing will continue to rise only
moderately despite the expect-
ed further decline in inflation.
Investment will also remain
sluggish; with the expected
recovery of export demand in
the second half of 2002 it may,
however, increase by around
2 per cent after stagnation in
2001. In some countries the continuing weakness
of construction – partly for structural reasons (as
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in eastern Germany) – will re-
main a drag on overall invest-
ment and growth.
Growth, employment and 
inflation
Altogether, in 2001 real GDP in
Western and Central Europe
can be expected to have grown
by about 3/4 per cent and grow
by 11/2 per cent in 2002. Given
potential output growth of the
Euro area of about 21/2 per cent,
the output gap (which was
around zero in 2000) will widen
significantly in both years which
implies a fall in overall capacity
utilisation (see Figures 1.9, 1.10
and 1.11).
With output growth weaker
than productivity growth, em-
ployment rose at a slow pace
while unemployment increased
in the course of 2001.This trend
will continue in the first half of
2002.3 On average, the unem-
ployment rate in the Euro area
is likely to rise from 8.5 per cent
to 8.6 per cent (see Figures 1.12
and 1.13).
As the rise in energy and food
prices came to an end and the
oil price fell, the inflation rate
declined in the second half of
2001. Assuming continued
moderate wage increases and a
drop of the oil price from about
$25 per barrel in 2001 to
around $20 per barrel on aver-
age in 2002, the inflation rate
(consumer prices) in the Euro
area will decline from 21/2 per
cent in 2001 to 13/4 per cent in
2002 on average, and to even




3 Due to the higher level of employment and the low level of unem-
ployment at the beginning of 2001, the average level of employ-
ment in 2001 was higher and the average level of unemployment
was lower than in 2000.the year. The headline inflation rate would be in
line again with the ECB target of “less than 2 per
cent”. (More details of the economic forecast are
provided in Annex 3.)
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Appendix 1
Ifo Economic Survey International (ESI)
ESI is a world-wide survey of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research, questioning - on a quarterly basis - more than 800 economists
of multinational corporations in 80 countries on the present economic situation of the country of residence and its economic prospec-
ts by the end of the next six months.CESifo Forum Special 14
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Germany
The slowdown of economic
activity has been more pro-
nounced than in most other
European countries. Economic
growth fell from more than
4 per cent in the first half of
2000 to slightly negative
growth in the third quarter of
2001 (seasonally adjusted
annual rate – 0.6 per cent) and
for the fourth quarter another
small decline is expected.
Various factors contributed to
this downturn: (1) the price
shock of higher energy and food prices which
dampened domestic demand in the second half of
2000 and the first half of 2001; (2) the weakening
of the US economy and the global economy which
weakened export demand and business confi-
dence; (3) as a result of weaker demand and (pos-
sibly) adverse effects of the tax reform4, invest-
ment in machinery and equipment declined and
stocks were reduced; (4) the ongoing recession in
the construction sector deep-
ened; (5) after the 11th Sep-
tember terrorist attacks in the
United States, business confi-
dence (as reflected in the Ifo
Business Climate Indicator)
plummeted further although
business expectations (which is
one component of the Busi-
ness Climate Indicator) had
turned around in preceding
months. In recent months the
level of this indicator has
approached (although not
reached) the low levels of pre-
vious recessions.Obviously the
adverse effects on the German economy were
much stronger than the fiscal stimulus of the tax
cut (1 per cent of GDP), which was implemented
at the beginning of 2001, and the easing of mone-
tary conditions. The increase in unemployment
reduced consumer confidence further.
Altogether, economic growth in Germany will
only amounted to 0.6 per cent in 2001. This year,
Appendix 2
Country reports
4 The corporate tax rate was reduced but
depreciation allowances became un-
favourable so that the effective marginal
tax rate rose.This may have induced firms




1999 2000 2001 2002
1)
Percentage change over previous year
a)
Private consumption 3.1 1.4 1.4 0.8
Government consumption 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.1
Gross fixed capital formation 4.2 2.3 – 4.1 – 1.7
Machinery and equipment, other 8.0 8.7 – 2.2 0.8
Construction 1.5 – 2.5 – 5.7 – 3.9
Domestic expenditure 2.6 2.0 – 0.5 0.4
Exports 5.6 13.2 5.1 2.2
Imports 8.5 10.0 2.0 1.8
Gross domestic product 1.8 3.0 0.6 0.6
Unemployment rate
b) (in %) 9.7 9.1 9.1 9.3
Consumer prices
c) (% change on
the previous year) 0.6 1.9 2.5 1.5
General government budget
balance
d) in % of GDP
e) – 1.6 – 1.3 – 2.6 – 2.5
1) Forecast of the Ifo Institute. – 
a) At 1995 prices. – 
b) Unemployment as a % of
labour force (employed and unemployed). – 
c) Price index for the cost of living
of all private households (1995 = 100). – 
d) On national accounts definition
(ESA 1995). – 
e) In 2000 without revenues from the auction of UMTS licenses.
Source: National Statistical Office, calculations of the Ifo Institute.with the expected recovery of the US economy
and the global economy the retarding factors will
lose their strength,the mild recession will be over-
come and economic growth
could accelerate to almost
3 per cent (annual rate) during
the course of the year. But
given the low starting position
at the beginning of the year
average growth will only be
again 0,6 per cent. Continuing
deterrents to expansion in
Germany are the structural
problems in the eastern Ger-




and the high marginal tax rates
on labour input. The relatively
weak increases in output in
both 2001 and 2002 will be
achieved entirely by improve-
ments in productivity. The
number of gainfully employed
may not increase until 2002 as
the economy recovers and
average unemployment in 2002
is expected to amount to
9.3 per cent. The previous goal
of the German government to
reduce unemployment to
below 31/2 million by the
autumn of next year will clear-
ly not be reached; according to
this forecast unemployment
will rise to almost 4 million at
that time.
The general government bud-
get deficit is expected to
amount to 21/2 per cent in 2001
and in 2002 which is significant-
ly higher than planned by the
Government in its stability pro-
gramme in the autumn of 2000
(11/2 per cent for 2001 and 1 per cent for 2002).The
fiscal slippage is to a large extent caused by lower
tax revenues in response to weaker growth.
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German Tax Reform
The income tax and business tax reform of 2001 aims at promoting
economic growth and employment. The direct budgetary costs of tax
reductions are estimated to amount to DEM 46 billion or 1.1 per cent
of GDP in 2001 (see table below). About 60 per cent of this reduction
increases the disposable income of private households and 40 per
cent benefits the business sector. The income tax reduction of 2001
will reduce the tax bill of wage earners by 11/ 2  to 13/ 4  per cent, de-
pending on the size of income. The corporate tax rate has been re-
duced significantly in order to bring business tax rates more in line
with those of other countries. The reduction of tax rates is accom-
panied by a broadening of the tax base, in particular the introduc-
tion of less favourable depreciation allowances. This leads to an in-
crease in the marginal effective tax rate on new investment (capital
costs). Furthermore, the full imputation system of the corporate
tax was abolished. Distributed profits bear the full corporate tax
paid by the firm. However, the recipient will pay income tax only
on half of the amount received (“Halbeinkünfteverfahren”). On
average, this should bring the effective tax rate on distributed pro-
fits close to that of income from other sources. For shareholders
with a marginal income tax rate of 40 per cent the tax burden on
distributed profits is similar to the old system while for those with a
marginal tax rate below 40 per cent the tax burden is higher and for
those with a marginal income tax rate of more than 40 per cent it is
lower than with the old imputation system.
Changes in taxes and social security contributions 
from 2000 to 2003
–: lower revenues +: higher revenues
2000 2001 2002 2003
DEM Billion
Taxes and social security
contributions – 1.0 – 46.4 – 36.0 – 45.1
Taxes + 3.0 – 39.3 – 25.7 – 31.5
Social security contributions – 4.0 – 7.1 – 10.3 – 13.6
Reduction of social security contribution (for persons) 
from 20.3 to 19.5 per cent (1.4.1999), to 19.3 per cent 
(1.1.2000), to 19.1 per cent (1.1.2001), to 18.9 per cent 
(1.1.2002) and 18.7 per cent (1.1.2003)
a) and introduction
of social security contribution for part-time-workers.
a)  Estimate for 2002 and 2003 based on information from the
government.
Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance. Calculated by the six
German economic research institutes.CESifo Forum Special 19
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Furthermore, the recent corporate tax reform may
have led to bigger revenue shortfalls than previ-
ously expected and it is suspected that, in the con-
text of VAT, tax evasion is widespread.




















a) Corporate taxes inc. local taxes.
Source: Federal Ministry of Finance.
Tax reform measures
Step 1 Step 2  Step 3




a) 40.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Corporate marginal tax rate
Retained earnings
b) 51.8 38.6 38.6 38.6
Distributions
c) 61.5 54.3 53.9 52.2
Non-corporate sector
d)
Top marginal income tax 43.0 48.5 47.0 42,0
Total marginal tax rate
b) 54.5 51.4 50.1 45.7
Household sector
Marginal income tax rate
at the bottom 22.9 19.9 17.0 15.0
at the top 51.0 48.5 47.0 42.0
incl. solidarity tax 53.8 51.2 49.6 44.3
Basic tax allowance (DEM) 13.500 14.000 14.500 15.000
Income bracket for top marginal
tax rate (DEM) 115.000 107.500 102.000 102.000
a) Retained earnings. – 
b) Incl. solidarity tax and local business tax. – 
c) For
shareholders with the top marginal income tax rate, incl. solidarity tax. –
d) From 2001, firms can de facto deduct a good part of the local business tax
from their income tax bills.France
Whereas real GDP increased by 3.4 per cent in
2000, economic growth slowed markedly during
2001. But the slowdown was less pronounced than
in Germany;in the third quarter GDP growth even
picked up a bit (to 0.5 per cent against the previous
quarter).As elsewhere, the slowdown in the world
economy reduced export growth.The consequence
was a weakening of business investment. Further-
more, firms reduced stock-building. The govern-
ment provided fiscal stimuli by cutting income
taxes and social security charges which supported
private consumption.Even more,the 35 hour-week
will also be introduced in small firms at the begin-
ning of 2002 and the job programme for the young
will be continued which both will be supportive of
employment in the short term.As we have seen in
recent years, a favourable situation in the labour
market is of upmost importance for private con-
sumption – and it will be decisive for the general
election and the presidential election held in May
2002. For that reason the government can be
expected to stimulate employment directly and
indirectly beyond the present programmes. These
are costly for the government budget. Despite con-
CESifo Forum Special 20
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Fiscal Policy in France
Between 1997 and 2000, France experienced a strong macroeconomic expansion. This pick-up followed a se-
vere and protracted recession which had a substantial impact on public debt. The latter increased from
39.5 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 65.1 per cent in 1998, as a result of both automatic stabilisers and the intro-
duction of various subsidies and tax cuts in order to stimulate activity. Therefore, during this period, France
moved from a situation where it was quite virtuous, to a situation where its debt/GDP ratio is now similar to
that of other countries. During the more recent expansion, the fiscal stance improved, and the budget deficit
gradually fell from over 3 per cent of GDP to less than 2 per cent.
General government deficit (% of GDP)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
4.2 6.0 5.5 5.6 4.1 3.0 2.7 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.4
Most of this improvement, however, is due to automatic stabilisers. There has been no attempt to take ad-
vantage of the previous expansion to reverse the earlier trend of growing public debt, which was still equal to
64.5 per cent in 2000, lower than the average of the Euro area but larger than in Germany and the UK. In-
stead, the government implemented some tax cuts, most notably of VAT in 1997, and increased its spending
commitments. In particular, there has been no pension reform, despite the fact that the current situation is
financially unsustainable. For example, contrary to what happened in Germany, the retirement age has not
been increased. As this is a politically sensitive issue, it is likely not to be tackled seriously before it actually
occurs, i.e. in 2010, when baby-boomers come to retirement. This lack of reform is likely to generate strains
on public finances in the future. The workweek has been reduced by more than 10 per cent as of January
2000, without any compensating fall in take-home pay although trade unions have accepted moderate wage
increases. In order to offset the effect of the reduced workweek on this large increase in labour costs, the
government has subsidised wages for firms that shift to the 35-hour week. The fiscal cost of these measures is
about FF 100 billion a year. There has been no attempt to reduce the size of the public sector, although the
fraction of the workforce employed in the public sector is one of the largest of the OECD, and despite a his-
torical opportunity due to large numbers of retirements in the civil service in the coming year. Instead, re-
cruitment has been slightly increased where needed (hospitals), but staff was not reduced where possible
(the modernisation of some sectors like the tax administration was blocked by unions). Active labour mar-
ket policies were increased despite their already high cost of about FF 200 billion a year, and most measures
(in particular the emplois-jeunes) favoured employment in the public or non-business sector. Future pressu-
re to transform these temporarily funded relief jobs into permanent positions in the public sector is likely to
arise, thus contributing to an increase in government expenditures. As a result, the cyclically adjusted budget
deficit (as measured by the OECD) remained between 1.8 and 2.2 per cent of GDP over this expansion pe-
riod. The major consequence of this development is that if a new recession were to come, France would
emerge from it in a financially fragile position, with a debt of perhaps 70 to 90 per cent of GDP, and the need
for a painful adjustment like in Italy and Belgium. This would not be the case if France had accumulated a
surplus during the recent period of very strong growth, as sound economics recommends. In the longer run,
the trend toward an excessively large public sector continues. According to the OECD, in 2000 government
outlays amounted to 51.4 per cent of GDP, ranking second in the OECD after Sweden. Similarly, France
ranks among the top countries in terms of public employment, with a share of over 25 per cent.CESifo Forum Special 21
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strained government spending in some areas,trans-
fers from the central budget to local budgets will
show an increase of 8.4 per cent in 2002 as against
2001. Consequently the public deficit is on the rise.
After a level of 1.4 per cent of GDP in 2000 and
more than 11/2 per cent in 2001, it might amount to
about 21/4 per cent in 2002, thus clearly missing the
targets of the Stability and Convergence
Programme. While public consumption will grow
steadily by 2 per cent, private consumption will
gain momentum in the course of 2002, but given
the relatively low starting level at the end of next
Why is inflation so low in France?
Standard macroeconomic thinking holds that when tensions on product and labour markets are too high,
wages and prices adjust upwards, thus generating inflationary pressure. Typically, this occurs when unem-
ployment falls below the so-called “natural rate”, which depends on regulation and frictions in product and
labour markets. Therefore, if one has an idea of the level of the natural rate, one should be able to predict in-
flationary tensions by estimating the difference between this natural rate and actual unemployment (or,
equivalently, the “output gap”). However, the natural rate itself moves, and macroeconometric analysis
sheds little light on the structural causes of such moves. For example, in the early 1990s in the United States,
many economists thought the natural rate to be about 6 per cent, and would have expected the strong expan-
sion that was observed in the second half of this decade to increase inflation. In fact, inflation did not exceed
2 per cent and was actually lower than in the preceding period, despite unemployment falling continuously
to 4 per cent in 2000. To critics of orthodox economics, such episodes suggest that the concept of a natural ra-
te is simply useless. To us, it means that the natural rate has fallen for structural reasons that need to be inve-
stigated. In an interesting paper, Shimer (1998) argues that this can be entirely explained by changes in the
composition of the workforce, due to a lower share of younger workers and an improvement in education.
However, the growth pick-up of the period (see chapter on growth) has also played a role in disinflation, sin-
ce faster productivity growth reduces price inflation for any given level of wage inflation. According to the
US Bureau of Labor Statistics, wage inflation has been moderate at 3 per cent during this period, but increas-
ed to 4 per cent in 2000. An indicator of labour market tensions like the help wanted index went up, as is al-
ways the case in expansions, but by less than in previous cycles. Superficially, the strong expansion in France
in 1997–2000 exhibits similarities. Unemployment fell rapidly from over 13 per cent to less than 9 per cent. A
lot of unemployment at the beginning of this period was “Keynesian”, i.e. in excess of the natural rate, due to
the severe recession of the mid-1990s. On the other hand, the natural rate of unemployment was expected to
be significantly higher than in the United States because of a rigid labour market and the absence of signifi-
cant structural reforms. Indeed, in the expansion of the late 1980s, as unemployment fell to near 8 per cent, a
sharp increase in labour supply bottlenecks was observed, suggesting a low search activity of many unem-
ployed workers. This created wage pressure and inflationary tensions, which eventually brought the econo-
mic expansion to a halt. This episode suggested that the natural rate of unemployment was around 8 to 9 per
cent at that time. Given that no institutional reform aimed at improving the labour market was implemented
in the 1990s, it was reasonable to expect a similar scenario in the current boom, with unemployment stabilis-
ing at 8 to 9 per cent, and a sharp rise in labour market tightness indicators. Indeed, unemployment botto-
med at 8.5 per cent in the spring of 2001 and has been going up again since then. And indicators of hiring dif-
ficulties went up sharply in early 2000, by virtually the same amount as in the previous expansion, and much
more for the least skilled workers.
1 The emergence of labour market bottlenecks suggests that wage pressure
should have picked up, thus putting upward pressure on inflation. But, in fact, this has not happened. Until
recently, both price and wage inflation had been moderate. Therefore, this situation has been paradoxical, in
that tension indicators suggested – at least until spring 2001 – a labour market tightness, while the behaviour
of wages and prices suggested otherwise. How can we reconcile these two facts? Although this is the matter
of much speculation, we can at least point out two factors. First, inflation has been suppressed as wage mode-
ration agreements were signed in many firms as part of the transition to the 35-hour week. If tensions persist
in the labour market, such moderation will probably be lost when these contracts are renegotiated. That is,
these arrangements have delayed the inflationary impact of labour market tightness. Second, price adjust-
ment has been delayed to some extent because of the transition to the euro in 2002. Since, at this date, all
firms will have to change their prices anyway, it is not worth for a given firm to increase its price six months or
one year ahead of the event, as competitors will typically not do so simultaneously, so that the firm runs the
risk of losing customers. Indeed, in the summer of 2001, there were signs of substantial price hikes in the re-
tail sector as firms set their euro prices, so much that the Ministry of Finance threatened to impose “sanc-
tions”. More generally, prices are only one tool of adjustment; firms can play on other margins such as delive-
ry lags, product quality, etc. Different instruments will be used depending on circumstances. But given the
most recent cyclical weakening of the economy, it is likely that inflation will remain moderate.
1 See Pisani-Ferry (2000), fig. 19, p. 95.year consumption growth will be lower than in
2001. Gross fixed investment will recover only
slowly next year, since there is no indication that
housing investment or investment in plant and
machinery will pick up significantly before
autumn.
Based on a recovery of the world economy,exports
and overall economic growth will pick up in the
course of 2002. Real GDP will increase by about
2 per cent in 2001 and 13/4 per cent in 2002. The
unemployment rate, which declined from 9.6 per
cent in 2000 to 8.6 per cent in 2001, is expected to
rise again to 83/4 per cent in 2002. Inflation will
remain modest and below the Western European
average. Consumer prices are likely to rise by
11/4 per cent in 2002 after 13/4 per cent in 2001;
retail trade is committed to keep prices stable in
order to avoid irritations while euro coins and
notes are introduced.The current account will con-
tinue to show surpluses in the order of 11/2 per cent
of GDP.







Percentage change over previous year
a)
Private consumption 2.8 2.5 2.7 1.9
Public consumption 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.2
Gross fixed capital formation 6.2 6.1 2.7 0.7
Domestic demand 3.0 3.6 1.7 1.8
Exports 4.0 12.6 3.0 1.7
Imports 4.7 14.2 2.3 1.8
Gross domestic product 2.9 3.1 2.0 1.7
Unemployment rate
b) (in %) 11.2 9.6 8.6 8.8
Consumer prices
c) (% change on
the previous year) 0.6 1.8 1.8 1.3
General government financial
balance
d) in % of GDP
e) – 1.6 – 1.3 – 1.6 – 1.4
1) Forecast of the Ifo Institute. – 
a) At 1995 prices. – 
b) Unemployment as a % of
labour force (employed and unemployed). – 
c) Price index for the cost of living
of all private households. – 
d) On national accounts definition (ESA 1995). –
e) In 2000 without revenues from the auction of UMTS licenses.
Source: Eurostat, National Statistical Office, calculations of the Ifo Institute.CESifo Forum Special 23
Chapter 1
Italy
After an increase in GDP of
2.9 per cent in 2000, which was
the highest rate since 1995,eco-
nomic growth slowed in 2001.
The world-wide slump of the
IT-sector did not hurt very
much since this industry does
not play a role worth mention-
ing. The slowdown of growth
was caused by a parallel weak-
ening of domestic demand and
exports. Industrial production
and business confidence fell
during the first half of 2001 and
business investment weakened
significantly; while the upswing
in construction slowed only
moderately, the investment
boom in machinery and equipment came to an
abrupt halt not only for cyclical reasons. There
were clear signs of a recovery before the
September terrorist attacks as business confidence
had improved and order inflow had picked up.
Despite a modest decline,the consumer confidence
indicator remained on a high level. After the
events of 11th September hopes for a recovery
were dashed and business confidence declined
sharply. But the consumer climate was still
favourable.
Employment continued to rise at about the same
pace as in 2000 (1.6 per cent). It appears that the
measures to reduce labour market restrictions
taken since 1998 (more flexible labour contracts)
are having a positive impact on employment; the
strong increase of part-time jobs is perhaps the
most striking evidence.Private consumption,which
had been supported in 2000 by the drop in the sav-
ings rate, decelerated to a rate similar to that of
real disposable income, due to the oil and food
price shocks (they have been petering out since
midyear) which reduced the purchasing power of
private households.
In the course of 2002 exports are expected to
recover which will stimulate demand in addition to
expansionary monetary policy. Real GDP can be
expected to increase by about 11/2 per cent after
13/4 per cent in 2001,implying a steady acceleration
in the course of 2002. There will be a steady
increase in public consumption, a slight accelera-
tion of private consumption, but gross fixed invest-
ment is expected to grow significantly in the later
course of the year due to new fiscal incentives (a
second “Legge Tremonti”).Inflation is likely to fall
from 23/4 per cent in 2001 to almost 2 per cent in
2002. The rate of unemployment which declined
from 10.5 per cent in 2000 to 91/2 per cent in 2001 is
expected to remain almost unchanged in 2002.
As in Germany and in France the economic slow-
down will cause an overshooting of the fiscal
deficits of the targets of the stabilisation pro-
gramme despite unorthodox operations like signif-
icant sales of public real estate etc. The deficit
might amount to 11/4 per cent of GDP in 2001 and
2002 compared with the targets of 0.8 per cent and






Percentage change over previous year
a)
Private consumption 2.3 2.9 1.6 2.1
Public consumption 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.7
Gross fixed capital formation 4.6 6.1 1.5 2.5
Domestic demand 2.3 4.1 1.8 2.0
Exports 0.0 10.2 3.9 2.0
Imports 5.1 8.3 3.8 3.9
Gross domestic product 1.6 2.9 1.8 1.4
Unemployment rate
b) (in %) 11.3 10.5 9.6 9.8
Consumer prices
c) (% change on
the previous year) 1.7 2.6 2.7 2.0
General government financial
balance
d) in % of GDP
e) – 1.8 – 1.5 – 1.3 – 1.2
1) Forecast of the Ifo Institute. – 
a) At 1995 prices. – 
b) Unemployment as a % of
labour force (employed and unemployed). – 
c) Price index for the cost of living
of all private households. – 
d) On national accounts definition (ESA 1995). –
e) In 2000 without revenues from the auction of UMTS licenses.
Source: Eurostat, National Statistical Office, calculations of the Ifo Institute.United Kingdom
After an increase in real GDP
of 2.9 per cent in 2000, growth
decelerated albeit less than in
most other countries.The slow-
down was caused by signifi-
cantly weaker export growth,
which was affected by the glob-
al downturn, the sharp adjust-
ment of high-tech industries
and the overvalued pound
Sterling. In addition, the inter-
national competitiveness of
manufacturing continued to
dwindle and production began
to decline in late summer of
2000, albeit slowly. By contrast,
the service sector and also the
construction sector held up
much better and the “split economy” continued.
The unemployment rate continued to decline.
Headline inflation increased as consumer demand
remained strong. It came down somewhat in the
second half of the year when the temporary effects
on food prices of the poor weather conditions and
the BSE and foot-and-mouth-epidemic waned.
Economic policies remain expansionary. Given a
budgetary surplus, which provides room for
manoeuvre, and pressures to improve the public
infrastructure and public services, public spending
– including investment in the public infrastructure
which underpins further growth of construction –
will continue to be increased significantly in 2002;
between April and October 2001 spending grew by
as much as 9.6 per cent (annual rate).Furthermore,
tax credits for various purposes (e.g. R&D invest-
ment,work incentives and saving) have been intro-
duced. Monetary policy has been eased in the light
of deteriorating economic prospects, the high
Sterling exchange rate and the low inflation rate.
After the September terrorist attacks, interest
rates were cut further, reaching a historically low
level.A further cut seems likely in order to support
demand in general and the manufacturing industry
in particular.
Economic growth is expected to slow from 2.9 per
cent in 2000 to 21/4 per cent in 2001.An improving
global economy and the strong expansionary
stance of economic policies should support aggre-
gate demand, and growth is expected to accelerate
in the course of 2002. Average growth in 2002 will
amount to 13/4 per cent. This rate means an accel-
eration in the course of the year with public con-
sumption and public construction picking up
strongly. Private consumption will grow less, since
increasing unemployment will cause an increase of
the savings rate. Investment by the manufacturing
industry is not expected to revive until the later
course of 2002 and then only slowly. Consequently,
it may not contribute appropriately to the coming
upswing of the world economy.The unemployment
rate might rise from around 5 per cent in 2001 to
51/2 per cent in 2002. The inflation rate (CPI) will
be. 11/4 per cent in 2001 and about 1 per cent in
2002 (after 0.8 per cent in 2000).







Percentage change over previous year
a)
Private consumption 4.2 4.0 3.9 2.4
Public consumption 2.8 1.6 2.5 3.5
Gross fixed capital formation 0.9 4.9 1.9 1.0
Domestic demand 3.9 5.0 3.0 2.4
Exports 5.4 10.2 2.0 1.0
Imports 8.9 10.7 3.7 2.8
Gross domestic product 2.1 2.9 2.2 1.8
Unemployment rate
b) (in %) 6.1 5.5 5.1 5.4
Consumer prices
c) (% change on
the previous year) 1.3 0.8 1.2 1.0
General government financial
balance
d) in % of GDP
e) 1.2 4.3 1.0 – 0.1
1) Forecast of the Ifo Institute. – 
a) At 1995 prices. – 
b) Unemployment as a % of
labour force (employed and unemployed). – 
c) Price index for the cost of living
of all private households. – 
d) On national accounts definition (ESA 1995). –
e) In 2000 without revenues from the auction of UMTS licenses.






1999(*) 2000(*) 2001(s) 2002(s)
Percentage change over previous year
a)
Private consumption 3.2 2.5 1.8 1.4
Public consumption 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.3
Gross fixed capital formation 5.4 4.3 – 0.5 0.7
Domestic demand 3.2 2.8 0.8 1.3
Exports 5.2 11.9 3.3 1.4
Imports 3.7 10.7 1.4 1.2
Gross domestic product 2.6 3.4 1.6 1.3
Employment
b) (% change on
the previous year) 1.6 2.1 1.4 0.4
Unemployment rate
c) (in %) 9.9 8.8 8.5 8.6
Consumer prices
d) (% change on
the previous year) 1.1 2.4 2.6 1.8
General government financial
balance
e) in % of GDP – 1.3 – 0.8 – 1.1 – 1.4
Memo item:
Real GDP in USA (% change
over previous year) 4.1 4.1 1.0 1.3
Real GDP in Japan (% change
over previous year) 0.7 1.5 – 0.3 – 1,1
(*) Preliminary. – (s) Forecast of the Ifo Institute. – 
a) At 1995 prices. – 
b) Do-
mestic employment. – 
c) Unemployment as a % of labour force (employed and
unemployed). – 
d) Harmonize index of consumer prices. – 
e) On national ac-
counts definition (ESA 1995); in 2000 without UMTS revenues.
Source: Eurostat, calculations of the Ifo Institute.
Economic Growth by Country and Region
Real GDP, percentage change over previous year
% weights
as of 2000
a) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
f) 2002
f)
Austria 0.82 2.6 1.6 2.0 1.6 3.5 2.8 3.0 1.1 1.3
Belgium 0.99 2.8 2.6 1.2 3.6 2.2 3.0 4.0 1.4 1.5
Czech Republic 0.22 2.6 5.9 4.3 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 0.4 2.9 3.4 3.5
Denmark 0.70 5.5 2.8 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.1 3.2 1.3 1.4
Finland 0.53 4.0 3.8 4.0 6.3 5.3 4.0 5.7 0.5 1.3
France 5.60 1.8 1.9 1.1 1.9 3.5 3.0 3.1 2.0 1.7
Germany 8.12 2.3 1.7 0.8 1.4 2.0 1.8 3.0 0.6 0.6
Greece 0.48 2.0 2.1 2.4 3.6 3.4 3.4 4.3 3.5 3.2
Hungary 0.20 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.8 3.7
Iceland 0.04 4.5 0.1 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.0 5.0 1.4 0.5
Ireland 0.41 5.8 10.0 7.8 10.8 8.6 10.8 11.5 6.3 3.5
Italy 4.66 2.2 2.9 1.1 2.0 1.8 1.6 2.9 1.8 1.4
Luxembourg 0.08 4.2 3.8 3.6 9.0 5.8 6.0 9.5 4.1 3.0
Netherlands 1.59 3.2 2.3 3.0 3.8 4.3 3.7 3.5 1.4 1.3
Norway 0.70 5.5 3.8 4.9 4.7 2.4 1.1 2.3 1.6 1.9
Poland 0.71 5.2 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.9 4.0 4.0 1.5 1.6
Portugal 0.45 2.2 2.9 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.3 3.4 1.9 1.6
Slovak Republic 0.08 4.9 6.7 6.2 6.2 4.1 1.9 2.2 3.0 2.9
Spain 2.41 2.4 2.8 2.4 4.0 4.3 4.1 4.1 2.7 2.2
Sweden 0.99 4.1 3.7 1.1 2.1 3.6 4.1 3.6 1.6 1.8
Switzerland 1.04 0.5 0.5 0.3 1.7 2.4 1.6 3.0 1.5 1.2
United Kingdom 6.14 4.7 2.9 2.6 3.4 3.0 2.1 2.9 2.2 1.8
Euro area
b) 25.65 2.3 2.2 1.4 2.3 2.9 2.6 3.4 1.6 1.3
European Union
c) 33.96 2.8 2.4 1.7 2.6 2.9 2.6 3.3 1.7 1.4
Western Europe
d) 35.75 2.7 2.3 1.6 2.5 2.7 2.5 3.3 1.7 1.4
Central Europe
e) 1.21 4.5 6.2 5.3 4.5 3.4 3.0 3.9 2.3 2.4
Western and Central Europe 36.95 2.7 2.4 1.7 2.5 2.8 2.5 3.3 1.7 1.5
Japan 20.00 1.0 1.6 3.5 1.8 – 1.1 0.8 1.5 – 0.3 – 1.1
United States 43.05 4.0 2.7 3.6 4.4 4.3 4.1 4.1 1.1 1.3
Total of the above countries 100 2.8 2.3 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.9 3.3 1.0 0.9
a) Aggregates were computed using nominal GDP weights of the previous year. – 
b) Excluding Greece until 2000. – 
c) Euro
area plus Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom and Greece until 2000. – 
d) European Union plus Iceland, Norway and
Switzerland. – 
e) Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic. – 
f) Forecast of the Ifo Institute.
Source: OECD, OECD Economic Outlook.CESifo Forum Special 26
Chapter 1
Inflation Rates by Country and Region
Consumer Price Index, percentage change over previous year
% weights
as of 2000
a) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
f) 2002
f)
Austria 0.82 3.0 2.2 1.8 1.2 0.8 0.5 2.0 2.3 1.5
Belgium 0.99 2.4 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.1 2.7 2.4 1.4
Czech Republic 0.22 10.0 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9 4.8 4.2
Denmark 0.70 2.0 2.1 2.1 1.9 0.9 2.1 2.7 2.3 1.6
Finland 0.53 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 3.0 2.7 1.6
France 5.60 1.7 1.8 2.1 1.3 0.7 0.6 1.8 1.8 1.3
Germany 8.12 2.8 1.7 1.2 1.5 0.6 0.6 2.1 2.4 1.5
Greece 0.48 10.9 8.9 7.9 5.4 4.5 2.1 2.9 3.7 3.0
Hungary 0.20 18.9 28.3 23.5 18.3 14.2 10.0 9.8 9.1 6.4
Iceland 0.04 1.5 1.7 2.2 1.8 1.3 2.1 4.4 6.6 5.5
Ireland 0.41 2.3 2.5 2.2 1.2 2.1 2.5 5.3 4.0 3.0
Italy 4.66 4.1 5.2 4.0 1.9 2.0 1.7 2.6 2.7 2.0
Luxembourg 0.08 2.2 1.9 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.0 3.8 2.4 1.2
Netherlands 1.59 2.8 1.9 1.4 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.3 5.1 2.7
Norway 0.70 1.4 2.4 0.7 2.6 2.0 2.1 3.0 2.7 1.9
Poland 0.71 32.2 27.8 19.9 14.9 11.6 7.3 10.1 5.6 3.8
Portugal 0.45 5.4 4.2 2.9 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.8 4.4 3.1
Slovak Republic 0.08 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.6 12.1 7.4 6.4
Spain 2.41 4.7 4.7 3.6 1.9 1.8 2.2 3.5 3.7 2.5
Sweden 0.99 2.4 2.9 0.8 1.8 1.0 0.6 1.3 2.7 1.6
Switzerland 1.04 0.9 1.8 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.8 1.6 1.0 0.7
United Kingdom 6.14 2.5 3.4 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.3 0.8 1.2 1.0
Euro area
b) 25.65 3.0 2.7 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.1 2.4 2.6 1.8
European Union
c) 33.96 3.0 2.9 2.3 1.7 1.3 1.2 2.1 2.4 1.6
Western Europe
d) 35.75 2.9 2.9 2.2 1.7 1.3 1.2 2.1 2.4 1.6
Central Europe
e) 1.21 24.7 23.3 17.5 13.7 11.5 7.0 9.1 6.2 4.5
Western and Central Europe 36.95 3.6 3.5 2.7 2.1 1.6 1.4 2.3 2.5 1.7
Japan 20.00 0.7 – 0.1 0.1 1.7 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.4
United States 43.05 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.3 1.6 2.2 3.4 2.9 1.9
Total of the above countries 100 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.4 1.4 2.2 2.1 1.4
a) Aggregates were computed using nominal GDP weights of the previous year. – 
b) Excluding Greece until 2000. – 
c) Euro
area plus Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom and Greece until 2000. – 
d) European Union plus Iceland, Norway and
Switzerland. – 
e) Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic. – 
f) Forecast of the Ifo Institute.
Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators; Eurostat, Eurostatistics.
Unemployment Rate by Country and Region
Standardised unemployment rates (per cent of civilian labour force)
% weights
as of 2000
a) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
f) 2002
f)
Austria 0.95 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.0 3.7 3.8 4.0
Belgium 1.06 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.4 9.5 8.8 7.0 6.9 7.2
Czech Republic 1.27 4.4 4.1 3.9 4.8 6.5 8.8 8.9 8.3 8.4
Denmark 0.70 8.2 7.2 6.8 5.6 5.2 5.2 4.7 4.5 4.7
Finland 0.63 16.7 15.2 14.5 12.6 11.4 10.2 9.7 9.1 9.1
France 6.37 12.4 11.7 12.4 12.3 11.8 11.2 9.6 8.6 8.8
Germany 9.76 8.4 8.2 8.9 9.9 9.3 8.6 7.9 7.8 8.2
Hungary 1.00 11.0 10.4 10.1 8.9 8.0 7.1 6.5 6.0 6.0
Ireland 0.41 14.4 12.3 11.7 9.9 7.5 5.6 4.2 3.8 3.9
Italy 5.74 11.2 11.6 11.7 11.7 11.8 11.4 10.5 9.6 9.8
Luxembourg 0.06 3.2 2.9 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.6
Netherlands 1.,94 7.1 6.,9 6.3 5.2 4.0 3.4 2.8 2.4 2.9
Norway 0.57 5.5 5.0 4.9 4.1 3.3 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.4
Poland 4.22 14.4 13.3 12.3 11.2 10.6 13.9 16.1 18.5 19.5
Portugal 1.22 7.0 7.3 7.3 6.8 5.2 4.5 4.1 4.3 4.8
Spain 4.05 24.1 22.9 22.2 20.8 18.8 15.9 14.1 13.2 13.3
Sweden 1.07 9.4 8.8 9.6 9.9 8.3 7.2 5.9 5.1 5.3
Switzerland 0.97 3.8 3.5 3.9 5.2 3.5 3.0 2.6 1.8 2.1
United Kingdom 7.12 9.6 8.7 8.2 7.0 6.3 6.1 5.5 5.1 5.4
Euro area
b) 32.21 11.6 11.3 11.5 11.5 10.8 9.9 8.8 8.3 8.6
European Union
c) 41.10 11.2 10.7 10.8 10.6 9.9 9.1 8.2 7.6 7.9
Western Europe
d) 42.64 10.9 10.5 10.6 10.4 9.7 8.9 7.9 7.4 7.7
Central Europe
e) 6.49 11.9 11.1 10.3 9.6 9.4 11.9 13.2 14.6 15.2
Western and Central Europe 49.14 11.1 10.6 10.6 10.3 9.6 9.3 8.6 8.4 8.7
Japan 16.56 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.7
United States 34.30 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.7 6.1
Total of the above countries 100 8.0 7.6 7.6 7.3 6.9 6.8 6.4 6.6 7.3
a) Aggregates were computed using nominal GDP weights of the previous year. – 
b) Euro area without Greece. – 
c) Euro
area plus Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom. – 
d) European Union plus Norway and Switzerland. – 
e) Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland. – 
f) Forecast of the Ifo Institute.
Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators; Eurostat, Eurostatistics.